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BOOK REVIEW
ETHICS INSIDE THE LAW FIRM
DO IT MY WAY OR YOU'RE FIRED. By David W. Ewing. New
York, N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1983. Pp. xii, 387. $17.95.
Reviewed by L. Harold Levinson*
The legal profession should clarify the mutual duties of law
firms and their associates. David Ewing's book, DO IT MY WAY
OR YOU'RE FIRED,' provides useful commentary on recent
trends in the management of business enterprises, although without specific reference to the management of law firms. Lawyers
may use Ewing's philosophy to supplement the proposed American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules),2 which deal to a limited extent with the duties of supervisors and subordinates in the law firm. This Book Review, however,
proposes a broader formulation of the duties of law firms and associates, one that is consistent with but that goes beyond the approaches of Ewing and the Model Rules. The theory of this Book
Review is that the law firm and its associates must recognize that
they owe each other a fiduciary duty which is an essential component of their professional fiduciary duty to society.8
Part I of this Book Review examines the two business management models -

the autocratic and the "good" -

that Ewing dis-

cusses in his book and concludes that the "good" management
model serves well as the basis for the law firm management theory
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.B.A., University of Miami, 1957; LL.B.,
University of Miami, 1962; LL.M., New York University, 1964; J.S.D., Columbia University,
1974.
1. D. EWING, Do IT MY WAY OR You'RE FIRED (1983).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (Proposed Final Draft Feb. 1983). This
Book Review was written after the February 1983 meeting of the American Bar Association
(ABA) and before the August 1983 meeting. The version of the proposed Model Rules that
the Book Review discusses is the proposal as amended at the February 1983 meeting. See
generally 69 A.B.A. J. 421 (1983) (discussing debate of ABA House of Delegates regarding
amendments to proposed Model Rules).
3. This Book Review explores only the relationship between partner and associate in
the law firm. To the extent that lawyers who are not members of a law firm share many of
the same duties and privileges, the analysis of the Book Review is applicable to them.
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that this Book Review proposes. Part II outlines the provisions of
the Model Rules that are relevant to law firm management. Part
III introduces this reviewer's theory of the fiduciary duties of law
firm partners and their associates. Part IV gives a hypothetical example of two law firm associates who face a series of dilemmas
when a law firm partner instructs them regarding the representation of a corporate client. Part IV offers solutions, first under the
Model Rules alone, then under a combination of the Model Rules
and the fiduciary theory. This juxtaposition demonstrates the more
comprehensive guidance that the fiduciary theory can provide.
Part V concludes that the fiduciary theory complements the Model
Rules and Ewing's "good" management model and creates a management theory that is desirable for law firms.
I. THE

EWING MANAGEMENT MODELS

Ewing, in DO IT MY WAY OR YOU'RE FIRED, portrays two
management models for business enterprises-the autocratic and
the "good."" Businesses in the autocratic model can discharge an
employee or subject him to other forms of "perfidious punishment" for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. 5 Employees consequently are in danger of discharge or punishment for
activities such as expressing dissent within the organization, blowing the whistle on the organization to outsiders, refusing to carry
out illegal orders, or refusing to submit to indignities such as sexual harassment. Ewing writes that this state of affairs leads to low
morale, loss of self-respect, and tension among the employees and
thus deprives management of the creativity and enthusiasm that
the employees otherwise could provide. The lack of cooperation between management and employees in an autocratic organization
also can harm the organization. For example, management may ignore an employee's warning that a crucial safety test taken during
the design stage was falsified, may discipline the employee for even
raising the issue, and may market a dangerous product. By mar4. Ewing uses the term "the 'good' organization" throughout his book to describe his
preferred model. See D. EWING, supra note 1, at 21-23 for the attributes of this model.
5. Ewing provides "A fiend's manual of perfidious punishment," by describing various
techniques-short of outright discharge from employment-that managers can use to express their displeasure with undesirable employees. These techniques range from moving
the employee's desk to the immediate proximity of a notorious cigar smoker to promoting
the employee to a useless job. Id. at 135-42. The most celebrated type of perfidious punishment in the law firm context occurs when a firm excludes an associate from the group that it
invites to become partners.
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keting this dangerous product the organization may suffer serious
consequences that management could have prevented if it had listened to the employee.
Ewing labels his contrasting model the "good" organization.
Management in the "good" organization is open and receptive to
employee comments, suggestions, and criticisms of managerial decisions and policies. This receptivity brings tension and conflict
into the open within the organization, encourages employee participation in decisionmaking, and assures fair procedures for the
proper handling of employee dissidence. The organization may discharge inefficient employees or employees who constantly complain
without good reason, but "good" management respects the views of
employees who assert reasonably arguable complaints. Employees
in a "good" organization, as a consequence, face discharge or punishment only for good cause and after fair procedures. The organization benefits from high morale, creativity, and enthusiasm. Employees and management cooperate in protecting the organization
against the marketing of a dangerous product. The organization
will discipline a manager who falsifies a product safety test, but it
will not punish an employee who reports the manager to his
superiors.
Ewing reports that the trend in business today is toward the
"good" model. Statutes, court decisions, collective bargaining
agreements, arbitrators' decisions, and the voluntary practices of a
number of corporations and public agencies all are moving in this
direction.' Many employers, however, both public and private, remain closer to the autocratic end of the continuum than to the
"good" end. Ewing urges greater progress toward the "good" and
away from the autocratic.
Ewing's book contains, in addition to management models, a
number of case studies; reported court decisions accompany some
of these studies. Although these case studies support Ewing's conclusion that the "good" management model is superior to the autocratic model, the book leaves a number of important questions
unexplored. As a result, Ewing's advocacy, although persuasive, is
not compelling. Ewing fails to answer questions such as how a
"good" organization protects confidential business information;
whether "good" organizations generally allow employees to participate in decisionmaking only on certain types of issues; whether
6. See Andrews, When You Whistle Where You Work, 11 STuDENT LAW, Mar. 1983, at
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employees tend to escalate their demands for participation and
thus maintain constant pressure on the organization to expand the
list of issues on which it allows employee participation; whether
the "good" management model is more suitable for some types of
businesses than it is for others; whether the need to consult with
employees stifles vigorous decisionmaking; and whether employees
who enjoy de facto job tenure in a "good" organization develop the
type of complacency that sometimes characterizes the tenured personnel of other institutions. Furthermore, Ewing fails in his book
to explore whether "good" organizations, by remaining receptive to
employee complaints and suggestions, achieve a degree of honesty,
fairness, and legality in their dealings with customers and other
outside parties that is demonstrably superior to the level which autocratic enterprises achieve. Ewing strongly implies that employee
input cleanses "good" enterprises and that the enterprises as a result deal fairly with customers and others, but he offers no statistical support for this view. A comparison of the track records of
"good" enterprises with autocratic enterprises on matters such as
products liability claims, prosecutions for illegal activities, or accusations of unfair business practices could test Ewing's hypothesis.
Ewing's model of "good" management would be attractive as a
matter of plain good business if he could demonstrate that "good"
organizations save money because their employees protect the or7
ganizations against costly mistakes or improprieties.
Ewing presents general guidelines for the employed professional such as the engineer, accountant, physician, nurse, or lawyer, but he does not explore the role of the employee-professional
who supervises other members of the same profession within a single business enterprise. Ewing points out that the professional employed by a business enterprise must cope with loyalties to his em7. Answers to these questions would help predict not only whether a corporation that
changes from an autocratic to a "good" system can expect to prosper or even to survive in a
competitive environment in which other companies cling to the old ways, but also whether
the industries of the United States can expect to prosper or even to survive in the international competitive arena if the general emphasis in American corporate management shifts
sharply from the autocratic to the "good" model. Studies of management styles and employee codetermination in various countries could provide essential comparative perspectives. See Symposium, Worker Participationin Management, 4 CoMP. L. Y.B. 3 (1980);
Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and

Applicability to the United States, 14 HARv. J. LEGIS. 947 (1977). A pending project of the
American Law Institute on the governance of corporations recently has stimulated interest
in reexamining the duties and liabilities of the directors of corporations in the United States
and may lead to exploration of the appropriate role of employee participation in corporate
governance. See Legal Times, Feb. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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ployer that often conflict with his professional code of ethics.' The
professional code of engineers, for example, requires them to place
the public interest above the interests of the client or employer.
Ewing urges business enterprises to respect the professionalism of
their employees. His "good" organization includes this element of
respect.
Although Ewing fails to mention the management problems of
law firms, his book provides significant insight into those problems.
The two models of business management that Ewing portrays-the
autocratic and the "good"-find their parallels in two corresponding models of law firm management. If a law firm adopts an autocratic style of management, the firm expects each associate to obey
without question the instructions of a partner. The firm rejects any
expression of concern by an associate and the firm may deny promotion or discharge the associate from employment if the associate
persists in questioning the partner's instructions. On the other
hand, a law firm that adopts the "good" style of management
welcomes an expression of concern by an associate and gives that
concern serious consideration. The firm respects the associate for
having cared enough to raise the matter even if it disagrees with
the associate on the merits of the matter.
Ewing's advocacy of the "good" model of business management is incomplete; thus the question whether the "good" management model is desirable or even workable for business enterprises
remains open. This Book Review, however, asserts that the "good"
model is desirable as a style of law firm management, in part for
the same reasons that Ewing advances for his preferred model of
business management. In addition, this reviewer's fiduciary theory
of the duties of law firm partners and associates provides support
for the conclusion that law firms should adopt the "good" model of
management. Following a discussion of the limited but significant
treatment that the Model Rules give to the issue of law firm management, this Book Review explores in detail the fiduciary theory.
II.

THE MODEL RULES

The Model Rules" expressly recognize some aspects of the re8. D. EWING, supra note 1, at 13, 125-28, 340-41.
9. See supra note 2. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility applies to all lawyers without differentiation between supervising and subordinate lawyers. In practice, a
subordinate lawyer who violates the Code under orders from a supervising lawyer may be
able to persuade the disciplinary authorities that mitigating circumstances existed. ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter ABA CODE]. See MODEL RULES OF
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lationship between the law firm and its associates. This part of the
Book Review discusses only the Model Rules that address specifically law firm management. The Model Rules also establish many
substantive rules to govern the practice of law. Part IV of this
Book Review applies the pertinent substantive rules to the hypothetical problem but discusses them only to illustrate the relationships between the law firm, the partner, and the associate that
arise when these rules are violated.
Model Rule 5.1(a) requires each partner in a law firm to
"make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct."'10 Subsection (b) of
Model Rule 5.1 requires a supervising lawyer to make "reasonable
efforts" to ensure that lawyers under his supervisory authority conform to the rules."' The bar may discipline the supervisory lawyer
if he orders or ratifies a violation of the rules by a subordinate.
Model Rule 8.4(a) reiterates the message of Model Rule 5.1(b)
when it states that a lawyer must not "violate or attempt to violate
the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce an2
other to do so, or do so through the acts of another.'1
Model Rule 5.2 imposes on subordinate lawyers obligations
that relate to the duties which Model Rule 5.1 imposes on partners
and supervisory lawyers. The subordinate who is accused of violating the rules can successfully defend by showing that he acted "in
accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty." s The Model Rule 5.2 defense, however, is very limited. The associate using the defense
must demonstrate that the resolution of the question by the supervisor was "reasonable"; he also must show that the question of professional duty was "arguable."
Model Rule 5.2 has three important implications. First, an associate must refuse to comply with orders that direct the associate
to act in clear violation of the rules of professional conduct. In addition, Model Rule 8.3(a) may require an associate faced with improper orders to report his supervising lawyer to the disciplinary
PROMSSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 5.2 comment (Proposed Final Draft May 1981).

10. See supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. This provision is troublesome because it introduces the defense of superior order, which defendants have asserted in some very different and sometimes tragic contexts in
recent years-ranging from the Nuremberg trials to the Watergate break-in.
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authorities, provided the disclosure does not include any information that the lawyer-client privilege protects. 14 Second, a law firm
under Model Rule 5.2 may not discharge or "perfidiously punish" 15
an associate who refuses to comply with an order that clearly violates the rules. Last, Model Rule 5.2 implies that a supervising lawyer must give to an associate upon request an explanation of any
order that the supervisor issues. The associate then can determine
whether or not the order results from the supervisor's "reasonable
determination of an arguable question."1 6 Although the Model
Rules contain some commendable guidelines for law firm management, they fail to provide comprehensive guidance for law firms or
associates. This Book Review suggests a broader formulation of the
duties of law firm partners and associates.
III.

PROPOSED

FIDuc

y

THEORY

This reviewer suggests that all lawyers owe to all other lawyers
a fiduciary duty that arises from the fiduciary obligation of the legal profession to society, and law firms should incorporate this
fiduciary duty into their management policies and practices.17 This
Book Review offers a preliminary formulation of principles for the
application of this fiduciary duty to the management of the law
firm. The principles would require relatively minor adaptation
before they could apply also to lawyers who work for governmental
agencies, business enterprises, or other employers that are not law
firms. These principles go beyond the American Bar Association
Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code) and the proposed
Model Rules. The principles, however, do not purport to address
the entire field of professional responsibility; instead they focus
only on law office management. Part IV of this Book Review illustrates these fiduciary principles of law office management by applying them to a hypothetical problem.
A.

Principle Number One: Development of Other Lawyers
A lawyer should contribute to the professional development of
other lawyers. This duty requires senior lawyers in a law firm to
train, support, and develop junior lawyers and to maintain a cli14.
15.
16.
17.

(1982).

See supra note 2.
See supra note 5.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT, supra note 2, Rule 5.2.
See Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1021
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mate in which junior lawyers can function and grow professionally.
This duty may include granting a request by an associate to transfer from an assignment that conflicts with his values. Junior lawyers have a corresponding duty to the firm and its senior lawyers
to express concern if a senior lawyer takes a position that a junior
lawyer regards as improper."8 This principle approaches Ewing's
"good" management model; in addition it requires all lawyers to
bear a fair share of responsibility for the development of the legal
profession-inside as well as outside the law firm.
B. Principle Number Two: Deference to Client
A law firm should give substantial deference to the values and
choices of a client. A responsible member of the law firm should
explain and discuss with the client any potentially significant value
conflicts between the law firm and the client. If the parties cannot
resolve these conflicts, the law firm should withdraw from representing the client.1 9
C. Principle Number Three: Deference to Law Firm
A partner or associate in a law firm should give substantial
deference to the values and choices of the law firm and of the firm
member who is directly serving the client. If the law firm cannot
resolve the value conflicts, the firm, to the extent feasible, should
grant the request of any lawyer in the firm for transfer to another
assignment. The firm should not require a lawyer to participate in
a case about which he has a value conflict with the law firm.
D. Principle Number Four: Acts of Conscience
A lawyer should be ready to serve society through an act of
conscience even if the act violates the law, the rules that govern
the profession, or the lawyer's duty to other lawyers, provided the
lawyer believes that this act of conscience is the only feasible way
to fulfill a duty to society that transcends his other obligations. A
18. See Note, A Remedy for the Dischargeof ProfessionalEmployees Who Refuse to
Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of ProfessionalEthics, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 805 (1975).

19. For recent explorations of the relationship between the law and the moral perceptions of the lawyer, see T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); O'Connor,
Professional Competence and Social Responsibility: Fulfilling the Vanderbilt Vision, 36
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1983). This reviewer does not subscribe to Professor Patterson's view that
law schools should teach only rules of law. See L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY V (1982).
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lawyer should be tolerant of another lawyer's acts of conscience.
Before taking adverse action against a lawyer who committed a violation by an act of conscience, a law firm or bar disciplinary
agency should consider the circumstances and the options that
were available to the lawyer at the time of the violation and take
into account the conscientious nature of the violation as a defense
or mitigating circumstance to reduce the severity of the sanction.2 0
IV.

HYPOTHETICAL LAW FIRM

The following hypothetical example provides a factual background for a discussion of the application to a law firm of Ewing's
book, the Model Rules, and the fiduciary theory that this reviewer
proposes. Assume that John and Jane are associates in a law firm.
A partner (Partner) assigns them to assist him in representing a
corporate client (Client). Assume also that Client is resisting enforcement of an order by a federal agency to correct certain safety
hazards in its workplace and that it has instructed the law firm to
use every available administrative and judicial proceeding to prevent or delay enforcement of the order. The law firm has entered
into an hourly fee arrangement with Client.
A. Hypothetical Problems
John and Jane encounter the following problem areas with
Partner and Client:
1. Padding Time Reports: Partner instructs John and Jane to
pad by about twenty percent their time reports for Client. This
padding will provide documentation for the law firm to bill Client
for substantially more time than the law firm spent on the matter.
2. Frivolous Position: John and Jane become convinced by
documents in Client's files and by legal research that Client is in
clear violation of the worker safety laws, that the agency's order is
completely proper, and that any resistance by Client is totally
frivolous.
3. Moral Disapproval:John has strong personal feelings about
the responsibility of employers to provide safe working conditions.
20. Violations of the ABA CODE, supra note 9, justified on constitutional grounds,
have become an accepted and apparently respectable means of testing the validity of ABA
Code provisions. See, e.g., In re R_ M. J_, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Violations of the law or the ABA CODE on grounds of conscience do not have the same authoritative support. For examples of disobedience on
grounds of conscience, see Levinson, Civil Disobedience and the Need for a Proportioned
Response, 20 U. FLA. L. RFv. 278 (1968); infra text accompanying notes 31-42.
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Even if Client could justify its position under any interpretation of
the law, John would suffer moral outrage if Client were to continue
to maintain unsafe working conditions for its employees.
4. Conflict of Interests: John's fiancee, Betty, is a lawyer on
the staff of the federal agency that ordered Client to correct the
worker hazards. The agency has not assigned Betty to handle any
aspect of the Client matter. John mentions this possible conflict to
Partner, who says that no conflict of interests exists because John
and Betty are not married, and that even if they were married, no
problem would arise unless Betty handled directly the Client
matter.
5. False Reports on Product Safety: A senior engineer employed by Client approaches Jane and tells her, "strictly off the
record," that Client is producing and marketing a product which
has a safety defect. As a result of this defect, a user of the product
could suffer serious or even fatal injury. To cover up this hazard,
former engineers repeatedly sent false reports of product safety
tests to trade organizations and regulatory authorities. Top management knows of the defect and of the false reports. The engineer
will give Jane a signed statement about the defect only if Jane first
gives him a signed statement from Client's top management that
guarantees no reprisals. The engineer says that without the statement from Client he will "forget" that he has ever spoken to Jane.
B. Application of Ewing to the Hypothetical
Since Ewing does not treat specifically the relationship between the law firm and its associates, his book does not help directly to resolve the hypothetical problems of John and Jane. Ewing's book implies that the law firm, like any other employer,
should engage in "good" management practices with its associates.
Ewing, however, does not explore how the law firm would implement "good" management. The hypothetical problem of the engineer who is an employee of Client and who wishes to reveal the
false product safety test reports that Client has issued does fit
within Ewing's discussion. Ewing asserts that top management of a
business enterprise should be receptive to employee complaints of
wrongdoing, and he concludes that if top management refuses to
listen, employees may have a duty to report publicly the problem,
especially if the employees are professionals like engineers.2 1 Ewing
asserts that the law should protect employees from management
21.

D.

EWING,

supra note 1, at 13, 125-28, 340-41.
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reprisals as indeed it does already in some states. 22 Ewing, however, does not explore the possibility illustrated in our hypothetical
that an employee with a complaint may seek the help of the law
firm that represents the enterprise.
C. Application of the Model Rules and the Fiduciary Theory
to the Hypothetical
The Model Rules and Ewing's general endorsement of "good"
management provide a firm basis for the development of the
fiduciary theory of legal professionalism. The hypothetical example
of John and Jane illustrates the apparent impact of the Model
Rules alone and the effect of the combined application of the
Model Rules and the fiduciary theory of duty.
23
1. Padding Time Reports
Partner's request that John and Jane pad time reports is a
clear violation of the Model Rules. Model Rule 8.4(c) prohibits
"conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-

tion. '2 4 Furthermore, padding time reports is inconsistent with the
obligation of a lawyer to his client to be competent, 2 diligent,26

reasonable with regard to fees,27 and independent in the exercise of
professional judgment based on candid advice. 8 John and Jane
therefore must refuse to pad time reports. Furthermore, Partner
has violated the Model Rules by giving the instruction. Model Rule
5.1(b) requires the supervising lawyer to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that lawyers under his authority conform to the Rules, and
Model Rule 8.4(a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly inducing another person to violate the Rules. John and Jane have a duty to
report Partner's violation to the bar discipline authorities because

22. See Andrews, supra note 6.
23. This footnote, as well as footnotes 30, 31, 34, and 36, cites the major provisions of
the ABA CODE, supra note 9, that pertain to the subject matter of the accompanying text.
With regard to padding a time report, DR 1-102(A)(4) is the same as Model Rule 8.4(c) in
that both provisions prohibit conduct that is dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative. DR 6-101 requires competence, DR 7-101(A) requires zealous representation, DR
2-106 prohibits illegal or clearly excessive fees, DR 5-101(A) requires the lawyer to exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of the client, and DR 1-103(A) requires that a
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of the Code report it to the disciplinary authorities.
24. See supra note 2.
25. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 2, Rule 1.1.
26. Id. Rule 1.3.
27. Id. Rule 1.5.
28. Id. Rule 2.1.
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the violation raises a substantial question about Partner's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Model Rule 8.3(c), which
incorporates the confidentiality provisions of Model Rule 1.6, apparently does not prevent disclosure of Partner's violation because
the disclosure does not reveal any lawyer-client confidences.
Partner's violation under the Model Rules is complete as soon
as he gives the instruction to pad the time reports, even if the associates do not comply with that instruction, and even if they can
convince Partner to withdraw his order. An associate who persuaded a partner to withdraw the instruction probably would not
report the matter to bar authorities, and even if the associate made
a report, the bar authorities likely would not impose discipline.
Nevertheless, the Model Rules do not expressly provide an excuse
if the supervising lawyer withdraws the improper instruction
before the subordinate complies.
Fiduciary Principle Number One, Development of Other Lawyers, in contrast with the Model Rules, would require John and
Jane to try to dissuade Partner from his misguided position. If
Partner persists, the same principle would require John and Jane
to seek further consultation within the law firm and through any
available advisory committee of the bar.2 9 The fiduciary theory, as

applied to this part of the hypothetical problem, thus emphasizes
the duty of a junior lawyer to make every attempt to correct an
apparent error in a senior lawyer's perception of professional duty.
2. Frivolous Position 0
Partner has violated Model Rule 3.1 by instructing John and
Jane to take a frivolous position on behalf of Client. Under the
Model Rules John and Jane should not comply with this instruction. 1 John and Jane, however, may find it impossible to report
Partner's violation to bar authorities because their report probably
29. See Note, supra note 18, for a discussion of a proposed advisory committee
system.

30. ABA CODE, supra note 9, DR 7-102(A)(1), (2). This rule prohibits frivolous
litigation.
31. ABA CODE, supra note 9, EC 2-26. This ethical consideration declares that a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered employment because the ABA Code stresses the
obligation of the legal profession to make legal services fully available. The Model Rules do
not assert this obligation. EC 7-8 suggests that the lawyer advise his client of the moral as
well as the legal aspects of a matter but emphasizes that the client must make the final
decisions. DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) permits a lawyer to withdraw from a case not pending before a

tribunal if the client insists that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer, even though no particular disciplinary rule prohibits it.
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would require disclosure of Client confidences to support their allegation that the position Partner wished to take was frivolous.
Fiduciary Principle Number One would require John and Jane
to try to dissuade Partner and, if necessary, to seek further consultation within the law firm and through any available bar advisory
committee. John and Jane also may explore the question whether
Fiduciary Principle Number Four, Acts of Conscience, would
oblige them to report Partner to bar authorities, even though the
filing of a report might violate the Model Rules provision on disclosure of Client confidences. John and Jane could invoke fiduciary
Principle Number Four only if they believed that the filing of a
report fulfilled a transcendent duty to society. Since Partner's intention to file one frivolous lawsuit is not likely to pose a danger to
society sufficient to justify a violation of the Model Rules, Fiduciary Principle Number Four does not require John and Jane to perform an act of conscience in violation of the Model Rules.
3.

Moral Disapproval

Model Rule 1.2(b)32 states that a lawyer's representation of a
client is not an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities. Model Rule 1.16(b)(5), however,
permits a lawyer to withdraw from representing a client if the "client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent."3 3 Model Rule 1.16(b)(5), by referring to
a client who "insists" upon pursuing the repugnant or imprudent
objective, implies that the lawyer first should discuss any problem
with the client in accordance with Model Rule 2.1, which permits a
lawyer to advise his client on "other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors" in addition to legal matters.3 4 The client, after hearing the advice of his lawyer, may "insist" on pursuing an objective that the lawyer regards as repugnant
or imprudent, in which event under Model Rule 1.16(b)(5) the lawyer may withdraw.
The Model Rules clearly permit a law firm to withdraw if a
client insists on pursuing an objective that the law firm regards as
32. See supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. ABA CODE, supra note 9, DR 5-101. This rule prohibits a lawyer from accepting
employment, except with the consent of the client after full disclosure, if the lawyer's own
financial, business, property, or personal interests will or reasonably may affect the exercise
of his professional judgment on behalf of the client. EC 9-6 urges lawyers to avoid not only
professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.
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repugnant or imprudent; thus John and Jane are well within their
rights in raising with Partner the question of withdrawal. Partner,
however, may decide for the law firm that Client's objective is not
repugnant or imprudent. The firm, as a courtesy, may permit John
and Jane to seek reassignment from a matter that is unpalatable to
them personally, but the Model Rules do not impose an obligation
upon the law firm to extend this courtesy.
Fiduciary Principle Number Three,35 Deference to Law Firm,
instructs that John has no right to impose his moral values on
Partner, the law firm, or Client, and Fiduciary Principle Number
Two, Deference to Client, cautions that the law firm also has no
right to impose its values on Client. Under both the fiduciary theory and the Model Rules, John does have a right to express his
moral concerns to Partner and others in the law firm to allow the
law firm to examine its stance on the value issue. If the law firm
shares John's moral disapproval of Client's position and the firm
fails to persuade Client to alter this position, the firm should withdraw. If, on the other hand, the law firm does not share John's
moral position, the law firm properly may proceed with the representation. The firm, however, under Fiduciary Principles Number
One, Development of Other Lawyers, and Number Three, Deference to Law Firm, has an obligation to relieve John of the assignment and reassign the matter to qualified personnel who do not
morally disapprove of Client's position. The firm must withdraw if
no lawyer in the firm with the requisite technical ability is willing
to work on the assignment.
The law firm may suffer inconvenience or financial loss if the
firm accepts the work from Client and then has to assign the matter to another associate because of John's moral disapproval and
subsequent inability to accept the assignment. If John frequently
rejects assignments on the ground of moral disapproval, this pattern may indicate that John is incompatible with the firm. He may
need to seek employment elsewhere, not as a reprisal for his moral
concerns, but because he should not insist that the law firm subsidize those concerns.
The fiduciary theory thus provides a framework for accommodating the varying value positions of the client, the law firm, and
the individual lawyer within the law firm. The theory also provides
increased protection for the associate whose values may differ from
the values of the client or of the firm.
35.

See supra part III(C).
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Conflict of Interests"6

Model Rule 1.7(b) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation may be "materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer's own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the
client consents after consultation. 3 7 The only possible basis under
Model Rule 1.7(b) for John's concern about his fiancee working for
the enforcing agency is that his own interests would limit his ability to represent Client. The law firm, as a courtesy, may relieve
John of the assignment, but the Model Rules do not appear to entitle him to this relief.
Fiduciary Principles Number Three, Deference to Law Firm,
and Number One, Development of Other Lawyers, require the law
firm to relieve John from the assignment if John feels professional
discomfort in representing Client. Although the law firm may regard John's attitude as overly sensitive, the firm should defer to
any reasonable request of an associate for reassignment. If John's
primary expertise, however, is in the area that the agency regulates
and he continues to ask for reassignment, he may be incompatible
with the firm.
5.

False Reports on Product Safety 8

Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits but does not require a lawyer to
disclose a client's confidential information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 9 In our hypothetical,
36. ABA CODE, supra note 9, DR 4-101(C)(3). This rule permits a lawyer to reveal the
client's intention to commit a crime. EC 5-18 states that a lawyer employed by a corporation
represents the entity and not any individual within the entity. EC 5-20 allows a lawyer to
serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, and EC 5-19 permits a lawyer to serve multiple
clients whose interests are not actually or potentially differing.
37. See supra note 2. In similar situations, Model Rule 1.13(b) requires that if a lawyer knows that an officer or employee of the client is conducting illegal and dangerous activities "in a matter related to the representation," the lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization." In the hypothetical example, the false
reports on product safety do not appear to be a matter "related to the representation";
hence this rule does not apply.
38. The law firm's silence arguably could render it liable in tort to victims of the dangerous product, but that possibility is beyond the scope of this discussion.
39. One commentator has indicated that many employees have paid serious personal
prices for whistle blowing, but that an increasing amount of legal protection recently has
become available to them. See Andrews, supra n6te 6. Andrews bases this conclusion on D.
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if the sale of Client's products after the filing of false safety reports
is a criminal act, and if the law firm determines that the sale of the
product in these circumstances is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm, the law firm either may make
disclosure or may remain silent.40
Under the Model Rules Jane should report to Partner her conversation with the engineer. The law firm then will have an opportunity to decide whether under Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) it may disclose the information and, if so, whether it should disclose the
information. Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) gives the law firm considerable
latitude; Jane has no basis to complain to bar authorities about the
law firm's conduct unless the firm discloses Client confidences
when Client is not about to commit a criminal act, or when Client
is about to commit an act that is criminal but clearly will not result in imminent death or substantial bodily injury.
The request by the engineer-employee that Jane protect him
against reprisals from Client triggers Model Rule 2.2, which discusses the role of a lawyer who acts as an intermediary between
clients. According to Model Rule 2.2, Jane must continue to regard
Client Corporation, not the engineer, as the law firm's client unless
the law firm also agrees to represent the engineer separately. The
law firm can accept the engineer as a client and act as an intermediary between the engineer and Client Corporation only if Client
Corporation gives prior approval. The law firm must give Client
Corporation reasonable information about the proposed intermediary role of the law firm before Client Corporation validly can consent to the arrangement. Partner and the law firm have wide discretion in this area. Under the Model Rules Jane has no basis for
complaining to bar authorities unless the law firm treats the engineer as a client before clearing the representation with Client
Corporation.
Fiduciary Principle Number One instructs Jane first to consult
with Partner, other members of the law firm, and any available
advisory committee of the bar. If these consultations do not resolve
the matter, Jane should consider Fiduciary Principle Number
Four, Acts of Conscience. In considering an act of conscience, Jane
must balance the consequences of her act for society against the
consequences for the engineer, Client, the law firm, and herself.
Jane's duty to society to protect potential victims from an allegsupra note 1, as well as on other sources.
40. See Andrews, supra note 6.
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edly dangerous product may require her to report Client's safety
hazard to appropriate authorities or to the press. Before reporting
the safety hazard Jane should examine the factual basis of the engineer's warning as carefully as possible and seek independent advice from other trusted persons. These attempts to obtain external
advice probably will violate the Model Rules regarding disclosure
of Client confidences, but this situation may justify conscientious
violation of these rules so that Jane can solicit advice. Jane should
make every feasible effort to seek advisors whose discretion and
capacity to retain confidences are beyond reproach.
If after careful analysis of the facts and consultation with
others Jane decides on the basis of her transcendent duty to society to report the safety hazard to the authorities or to the press,
she faces two possible responses. Her act of conscience may persuade the law firm, the engineer, Client, and the bar authorities
that she took the proper action. Her willingness to make a personal
sacrifice then may reform the attitudes and practices of others. On
the other hand, Jane's act of conscience may result in her discharge from the law firm and in disciplinary action by bar authorities. 4 1 She may emerge as an attractive candidate for employment
by a law firm or other organization that has a commitment not
only to Ewing's notions of "good" management, but also to the
proposition that a person who places her career on the line to protect the public against serious danger may be an employee worth
having.
The fiduciary theory does not and cannot give detailed guidance for the specific situations in which a lawyer should commit an
act of conscience. The theory, however, recognizes that each lawyer
ultimately must make an individual value judgment by weighing
his general obligations to obey the law, to conform to professional
rules, and to support other lawyers against a transcendent duty to
society. Some lawyers never may face this dilemma and others may
face it rarely. No theory of the professional duty of lawyers, how41. Even if the state has enacted a statute to protect whistle-blowers against retaliatory discharge from employment, see supra note 39, the impact of that statute on Jane may
be uncertain. The courts may hold the statute inapplicable to associates who are employed
by law firms, on the ground that any attempt to apply the statute to associates would encroach upon the power of the state's highest court to regulate the practice of law.

In addition to facing discharge and bar discipline, Jane may be subject to civil liability
to Client Corporation for disclosure of confidential information. If Jane is liable, the law

firm also may be liable under the principle of respondeat superior. The possibility of civil
liability for improper disclosure and the analogous possibility of civil liability for nondisclosure, see supra note 38, are beyond the scope of this discussion.
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ever, should ignore the possibility that this moral dilemma will
arise, and no theory should impose upon the lawyer an absolute
obligation to suppress his feelings of duty toward society when
these sentiments collide with his other obligations as a lawyer.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although Ewing's book fails to treat specifically the relationship between the law firm and its associates, his general orientation to "good" management is consistent with the theory of fiduciary duty that this Book Review proposes. Ewing's advocacy of
"good" management in business enterprises is in effect an assertion
that the managers of business enterprises are professionals with a
fiduciary duty to each other as well as to the employees, customers,
and suppliers of the enterprise. Ewing's model of "good" business
management could provide examples worthy of the serious attention of many professions.
The Model Rules also reinforce "good" management policies.
The Model Rules, however, neglect to provide the necessary framework for accommodation of the varying value positions of the client, the law firm, and the individual lawyers in the firm. The
fiduciary theory that this reviewer proposes incorporates the
Model Rule requirements pertaining to law firm management and
provides additional guidance for accommodating the varying value
positions that lawyers face.
The question arises whether the differences between the legal
profession and general business enterprises make Ewing's "good"
management model more or less appropriate for law firm management than for general business management. This Book Review asserts that the legal profession is an even more appropriate setting
than the business enterprise for adoption of the "good" management model. The fiduciary relationship among lawyers and the
bar's unique fiduciary duty to society emphasize the special need
of the legal profession for the "good" management model.
Some professionals argue that the bar best serves society when
law firms do whatever the client wants and when associates of law
firms do whatever the supervising partner wants. Obedience to the
client or to the supervising partner in a law firm is often a useful
virtue; society should be able to assume that lawyers generally will
follow the norm of obedience. The legal profession, however, owes
a duty to society that is higher than the guarantee of permanent
obedience.
Ewing reports that some stalwart employees of business enter-
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prises followed their consciences even though their employers were
autocratic. Many of these employees paid heavy personal prices for
taking these positions. These sacrifices, however, contributed to
the current acceptance of the "good" management model for business enterprises. The legal profession has important lessons to
learn from the employees who paid a price for their acts of conscience, as well as from the small but growing number of employers
who have adopted the "good" management policies and practices
that Ewing advocates in his book.

